Arming the Peace: Foreign Security Assistance and Human Rights Conditions in Post-Conflict Countries by Sullivan, Patricia L. et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Faculty and Researchers Faculty and Researchers' Publications
2020
Arming the Peace: Foreign Security Assistance
and Human Rights Conditions in Post-Conflict Countries
Sullivan, Patricia L.; Blanken, Leo J.; Rice, Ian C.
Routledge
Patricia L. Sullivan, Leo J. Blanken & Ian C. Rice (2020) Arming the Peace: Foreign
Security Assistance and Human Rights Conditions in Post-Conflict Countries,
Defence and Peace Economics, 31:2, 177-200,
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/64603
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.
Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun
ARTICLE
Arming the Peace: Foreign Security Assistance and Human
Rights Conditions in Post-Conflict Countries
Patricia L. Sullivan a, Leo J. Blankenb and Ian C. Riceb
aDepartment of Public Policy, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC, USA; bDefense Analysis
Department, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, USA
ABSTRACT
What are the effects of foreign security assistance on the quality of the
peace in post-conflict countries? Despite the stakes, and the tremendous
amount of weaponry and other forms of foreign military aid flowing to
governments of post-conflict countries, the academic literature provides
little guidance as to what effects policymakers and practitioners should
expect from this type of aid. Military assistance provided to the govern-
ment of a country emerging from the turmoil of civil war could enable
the state to establish a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, leading
to a more durable peace and greater human security. However, we
contend that significant flows of military aid and weapons from foreign
governments may encourage regimes to adopt more repressive
approaches to governance. We investigate the impact of security assis-
tance on human rights conditions after 171 internal armed conflicts that
ended between 1956 and 2012 using a novel measure of military aid and
an instrumented measure of weapons transfers. We find strong evidence
that both military aid and arms transfers to post-conflict governments
increase state repression.
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Competing narratives underlie expectations about the impact of providing military aid to states
recovering from the devastating effects of armed conflict. One narrative emphasizes stability as
a prerequisite for human security. From this perspective, military assistance could contribute to
greater security for citizens by increasing state capacity and enabling the post-conflict government
to establish a monopoly on the legitimate use of force within the state. But the nongovernmental
and intergovernmental organizations on the ground in conflict-affected regions often have
a different perspective on the human security impacts of arms transfers and military aid to post-
conflict governments. Their narrative emphasizes the risk that providing weapons, training, and
military equipment to fragile regimes discourages good governance, facilitates state repression,
and fuels violence.
Historical cases of security assistance provided to post-conflict countries offer qualified evidence
for both perspectives. Both South Korea and El Salvador received American security assistance while
they trod painful – and divergent – paths to recovery. South Korea is typically seen as a foreign aid
success story for the United States. The aid that the country received in the wake of the 1950–53 war
between North and South Korea helped propel it from among the poorest countries in the world to
a spot in ‘the trillion-dollar club of world economies.’1 But the aid that flowed to South Korea went
beyond economic assistance and had aims beyond the economic recovery of the war-torn country.
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The United States also provided security assistance – military aid, weapons transfers, training, and
advisors to increase the capacity of South Korean security forces to maintain internal order and
suppress left-wing elements. Although the ‘modernization theory’ that drove U.S. aid policy at the
time prescribed social order as a necessary condition for economic development (Gilman 2003),
scholars also maintain that U.S. military assistance facilitated the development of an increasingly
repressive state (Hwang 2016, 91). Within the context of the Cold War, U.S. advisors ignored human
rights violations by South Korean partner forces as ‘[c]ivil liberties and democratic standards were
subordinated to larger geo-strategic goals centered on containing Chinese communists and rolling
back the progress of the left’ (Kuzmarov 2012, 1). Bolstered by lethal aid from the United States, the
South Korean security sector perpetrated human rights violations, including extra-legal surveillance,
torture, and mass killings (Henderson 1968, 173). The U.S., Kuzmarov (2012) argues, ‘was integral in
creating a repressive internal security apparatus that made even hardened Cold Warriors blanch’ (14).
Both high levels of U.S. security assistance and brutal repression of dissent persisted in South Korea
for almost four decades until mass protests forced the government to allow direct election of the
president (Lee 2000).
Post-civil war El Salvador, on the other hand, could be viewed as a human rights success story.
The United States’ involvement during the Salvadoran civil war is often cited as an illustration of
how a patron’s assistance enables repression. For thirteen years (1979–1992), the United States
provided financial, materiel, and military training assistance to a state that was notorious for its
human rights atrocities (Americas Watch 1991, Amnesty International 1988). After the Chapultepec
Peace Accords were signed, the United States continued to provide substantial sums of military aid
to El Salvador, averaging $4 million a year in assistance over the post-conflict decade. Yet, as part of
its efforts to find a negotiated settlement to bring the war to an end, in late 1991 the U.S. began to
push the Salvadoran government to disband the Treasury Police and National Guard because of
their active role in supplying troops for government death squads during the war (Ladwig 2016).
Human rights reports from Amnesty International and other organizations reveal the positive
results of abolishing these units and other military reforms. According to Call (2002a), ‘Nine years
after the accords were signed, the [National Civilian Police] was more humane and accountable
than the old security forces. In contrast to the past, [National Civilian Police] officers accused of
torture, killings, vigilante activities and excessive use of force were subject to internal sanctions and
to judicial prosecution’ (402). Even with these improvements, the human security situation in
postwar El Salvador was far from ideal. The armed forces and powerful oligarchs resisted many
reforms to the security sector and the disbanded units responsible for human rights violations were
not replaced with competent organizations. Crime increased significantly, with murder rates
doubling in the wake of the Chapultepec Accords, reaching one of the highest rates in the world
by 1997 (Jones et al. 2006, 37). There is no question, however, that the security sector’s role in
violently repressing internal threats was greatly diminished.
The cases of South Korea and El Salvador illustrate both the complicated dynamics of human
security in post-conflict countries and the potentially important role of foreign military aid. This
study contributes to a growing body of research on the quality of the peace in countries that have
recently terminated an internal armed conflict (Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett 2003, Hoddie and
Smith 2009, Iqbal 2010, Jarstad 2009, Kang and Meernik 2005, Meernik, Nichols, and King 2010,
Huang 2016, Lai and Thyne 2007), focusing on the effects of foreign security assistance on human
rights conditions. We define the term ‘security assistance’ broadly as any state-authorized provision
of weapons, military equipment, funding, military training, or other capacity-building goods and
services to the security forces of a foreign government. We use the terms military aid, security
assistance, and security sector assistance interchangeably. Our outcome of interest is state repres-
sion defined as state-sanctioned violations of human rights including torture, extrajudicial killings,
forced disappearances, and political imprisonment.
Our study makes two unique empirical contributions. First, we adopt an instrumental variable
approach to address the potential endogeneity of arms transfers to a recipient regime’s intent or
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propensity to engage in repression of the domestic population. Second, in order to investigate the
impact of other forms of security assistance, as well as aid provided by countries other than the
United States, we code a novel measure of military aid from event data. We find strong evidence
that both military aid and weapons transfers are associated with substantial increases in state
repression in post-conflict countries. In contrast, levels of Official Development Assistance (ODA)
are positively correlated with human rights conditions in post-conflict countries.
In the next section we situate our study within the growing literature on the human security
effects of foreign aid in conflict-affected countries. Next, we develop an argument concerning
leaders’ strategies for maintaining power in post-conflict states and the potential for security
assistance to tip a regime’s cost-benefit calculus away from a good governance strategy in favor
of a restricting and repressing strategy that places greater emphasis on providing private goods to
a select few and repressing dissent among the masses. We then turn to our research design for
testing the empirical implications of our theory and present the results of our analysis. Finally, we
conclude with a summary and recommendations, paying particular attention to current debates
about U.S. foreign policy and what our analysis might suggest for policymakers.
Foreign Aid and Human Rights Conditions
Empirical research to date has emphasized the effects of development and humanitarian aid in
fragile and conflict-affected states, largely ignoring the impact of military assistance. Moreover, the
economic aid literature is divided about the impact of foreign aid on human security. De Ree and
Nillesen (2009) suggest that development aid could increase military expenditures by recipient
states leading to an increase in military capacity that would act as a deterrent to rebel violence.
Consistent with this argument, they find that development aid shortens armed conflicts in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Similarly, Savun and Tirone (2012) argue that foreign aid can protect government
spending from the effects of economic downturns, providing them with the resources they need to
deter opposition groups from resorting to violence. Their evidence shows that aid reduces the
likelihood that an exogenous economic shock causes conflict. Apart from these studies, however,
much of the recent research does not paint a particularly optimistic picture of the potential for aid
to improve human security in post-conflict countries. Development aid has been linked to an
increase in corruption, lower levels of public goods provision, and human rights violations in
countries with weak mechanisms of accountability (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010,
Cingranelli, Fajardo-Heyward, and Filippov 2014, Bell et al. 2013, DeMeritt and Young 2013,
Knack 2001, Easterly 2006). In addition, most recent studies have concluded that, under a fairly
broad range of conditions, violence is worsened by the provision of foreign aid to conflict-affected
regions and fragile states (Besley and Persson 2011, Narang 2015, Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011,
Fishstein and Wilder 2012, Böhnke and Zürcher 2013, Nunn and Qian 2014, Wood and Sullivan
2015, Tahir 2017, Zürcher 2017).
In contrast to the literature on the impacts of economic aid, the military aid literature tends to
focus on assistance provided to combatants during active armed conflicts. One noteworthy
example is a micro-level study conducted by Dube and Naidu (2015) providing strong evidence
that U.S. military aid to Colombia increased homicides and political assassinations by pro-
government paramilitary groups because the government military brigades that received the aid
funneled some of it – including weapons and ammunition – to these groups. These results suggest
a potential causal pathway to explain findings from earlier studies that arms transfers are asso-
ciated with poor human security outcomes in less-developed countries.
Only a handful of other studies systematically investigate the impact of military aid on civilian
populations outside the context of an ongoing war. This scholarship tends to focus on weapons
transfers. Like much of the literature on economic aid, the bulk of the research on arms transfers
concludes that major conventional weapons transfers to developing countries increase human
rights abuses and impede democratization (Blanton 1999a, 1999b, de Soysa, Jackson, and Ormhaug
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2010). More recently, Pamp et al. (2018) find that conventional weapons imports increase the risk of
intrastate conflict onset – particularly in countries with other risk factors for political violence. This
study echoes results from Craft and Smaldone (2002) who find that arms imports increase the risk
of civil war in sub-Saharan Africa.
In sum, extant research leans toward a pessimistic outlook on the prospects for foreign
assistance to improve human security in fragile and conflict-affected countries. While there is
some evidence that economic aid could increase the capacity of governments to deter violent non-
state actors and lessen armed conflict, most studies suggest economic aid, military assistance, and
arms transfers all negatively impact governance and human rights conditions.
Theoretical Framework
We build our argument in three parts. First, we draw on existing theoretical models of the essential
strategic choices faced by political leaders seeking to remain in office. Second, we show how the
nature of military aid and arms transfers may alter the calculus of leadership as it chooses the types
of strategies to employ in a post-conflict context. Finally, we generate a testable implication from
this argument for levels of state repression in post-conflict countries. In sum, we argue that foreign
security assistance reduces a government’s incentives for investing in public goods, lowers the
marginal cost of repression, and strengthens the security sector relative to other government
institutions. As a result, we expect to see higher levels of state-sanctioned human rights abuses
when post-conflict countries receive military aid.
Recent scholarship views state policies as strategic choices by leaders with the primary goal of
maintaining the support of their constituents (Acemoglu and Robinson 2005; Bueno de Mesquita
et al. 2003). Because post-conflict societies are fragile and resource-constrained by nature, elites
must make particularly difficult choices about the allocation of scarce resources – choosing what
proportion of resources to allocate to providing public goods to the citizenry, and what proportion
to dedicate to repressing dissent and forcefully imposing order. More broadly, post-conflict
governments must choose the extent to which they will emphasize two opposing strategies for
maintaining power. On one end of the spectrum, regimes can choose a strategy of directing state
resources toward the provision of public goods to facilitate economic growth and legitimize rule
among a large proportion of the population. The strategic approach at the other end of the
spectrum involves minimizing the number of supporters the regime needs to stay in power,
directing state resources to the members of that winning coalition in the form of private goods,
and forcefully repressing potential challengers (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010). Both strate-
gies have benefits, costs, and risks.
The good governance strategy facilitates economic growth, and thereby the ability of the
government to generate revenue from taxing the population (Bueno de Mesquita and Root
2000, Acemoglu and Robinson 2005, DeMeritt and Young 2013, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).
But providing public goods like the rule of law, freedom of the press, and public education makes it
easier for dissenters to organize and challenge the government (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith
2010). At the same time, the good governance approach requires regimes to use resources to
deliver public goods, limiting leaders’ ability to enrich themselves and reward their supporters with
state resource and foreign aid rents.
Governments that do not want to make concessions to the public can respond to public
demands with repressive tactics that make it more difficult for opposition movements to organize,
publicize their grievances, and build support (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010, Poe and Tate
1994, Davenport 1995, Gartner and Regan 1996). This restricting and repressing strategy has the
benefit of allowing the governing regime to direct more state resources to specific beneficiaries.
Moreover, distribution of resources as private goods to key supporters gives a leader greater
control over state policies and decreases the risk that supporters of the incumbent leader will
defect to the opposition (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). On the downside, maintaining an
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effective repressive apparatus is expensive; leaders must direct resources to state security forces or
paramilitary groups, making these resources unavailable for private consumption. In addition, the
choice of more repressive measures may generate costs beyond the state’s borders if it reduces
a regime’s perceived legitimacy among international audiences – including the benefactor.
Many factors affect how post-conflict governments weigh the benefits, costs, and risks of
pursuing a strategy of good governance versus a more restrictive and repressive approach.
Moreover, the ends of the strategic spectrum are ideal types; most states exist somewhere along
the range, using both strategies to varying degrees (Blanken 2012). Institutions and leaders are
typically fragile in post-conflict countries. Partly as a result, levels of state repression tend to be
higher in post-conflict countries than in countries that have not recently experienced political
violence (Hafner-Burton 2014). However, even among post-conflict countries there is significant
variation in the extent to which leaders rely on repression to secure their hold on power. While
post-conflict human rights conditions return to a pre-conflict baseline in many countries, others
experience dramatically improved or drastically worse human rights conditions.
We argue that significant flows of lethal aid from foreign governments can tip a regime’s cost-
benefit calculus in favor of a strategy placing greater emphasis on private goods provision to
a select few and the repression of dissent among the masses. We propose two mechanisms linking
foreign security assistance to greater human rights violations by state forces; security assistance (1)
increases the state’s capacity and lower its costs for repression and (2) empowers state security
forces relative to other state institutions.
The first link between security assistance and human rights violations is best understood as
a moral hazard problem. Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) argue that repression ‘is often sufficiently
costly that it is not an attractive option for elites’ (xii), but security assistance increases a regime’s
capacity to violently repress domestic threats while lowering both the financial and political costs.
As numerous scholars have argued, governments that are dependent on taxing the population to
generate revenue have incentives to provide the public goods that will allow the population to be
productive (Levi 1989), but leaders who can rely on foreign aid or natural resource rents for
revenue lack these incentives (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009, Kono and Montinola 2013,
Lai and Morey 2006, Svensson 2000). As with other types of foreign aid, the ability to fund and
equip state security forces with external resources makes the government less dependent on
taxing the population to generate revenue, reducing its motivation to invest in protecting citizens’
human rights (Cingranelli, Fajardo-Heyward, and Filippov 2014) and mitigating the political risks of
repression (DeMeritt and Young 2013). Unlike other types of foreign aid, however, security
assistance and arms transfers directly bolster a regime’s repressive capacity, making repression
marginally less costly in a more immediate way than humanitarian and development aid.2
The second link between security assistance and human rights violations arises out of the ability
of the regime to distribute military training, weapons, equipment, and funding as private goods. In
states in which civilian control of the military is not solidly institutionalized, support from the
military is always essential to regime survival – and the military has incentives to resist any loss of
authority or autonomy. Foreign military aid and arms transfers can be used to buy the allegiance of
a military elite, ensuring their loyalty in the face of challenges from the wider citizenry (Savage and
Caverley 2017, Biddle 2017, Biddle, Macdonald, and Baker 2018). This aid reinforces the privileged
position of the military, empowering it relative to other state institutions and giving it an incentive
to work with the ruling regime to repress liberalization efforts that are likely to redistribute power
and resources away from the military (Savage 2017, Call 2002b). In many war-torn countries, the
military exercises control over internal security and is responsible for significant violations of
human rights. In these countries, major reforms that would improve human rights conditions
after conflict termination are only possible if the military is significantly weakened and their role
in internal security is curtailed and brought under civilian control (Call 2002b). But an empowered
military is likely to strongly resist any additional accountability, loss of autonomy, or restriction of
its internal security role. Donors, for their part, may even encourage the armed forces to retain their
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role in providing internal security to suppress threats to the donor’s own business or geostrategic
interests (e.g. communist insurgents during the Cold War, drug traffickers or terrorist groups more
recently) (McClintock 1992, Huggins 1998). As Biddle (2017) warns, security assistance provided to
the armed forces in authoritarian countries can encourage transformation of the national military
into an abusive praetorian guard – loyal to the regime or a particular sector of the population,
rather than an apolitical defender of the state.
If foreign security assistance reduces a government’s incentives for investing in public goods,
lowers the marginal cost of repression, and strengthens the security sector relative to other
government institutions, we should see increased violations of human rights when post-conflict
countries receive military aid. The receipt of lethal aid from foreign governments is neither
a necessary, nor a sufficient, mechanism for turning post-conflict countries into repressive states.
However, all else being equal, the provision of lethal aid will increase the likelihood of a package of
policies and choices that will result in human rights violations.
Hypothesis: Foreign security assistance (lethal aid) provided to post-conflict governments will
increase state-sanctioned human rights violations.
Research Design
We use the Strategies and Tactics in Armed Conflict (STAC) dataset to identify all cases of violent
conflict between an incumbent government and an armed opposition movement within a state
between 1945 and 2013 (Sullivan and Karreth, Forthcoming)(Bloom et al., Sullivan and Karreth 2013).
The STAC dataset builds on the widely used UCDP Armed Conflict (Allansson, Melander, and
Themnér 2017, Gleditsch et al. 2002) and Correlates of War project intrastate conflict (Sarkees and
Wayman 2010) datasets but provides more detailed information about sources and coding decisions
for each case. The dataset records 171 internal armed conflict terminations during this time period.
Our unit of analysis is the post-conflict country-year. There is an annual observation for the first ten
years following conflict termination for each country that experienced an internal armed conflict.
Dependent Variable: State Repression
As a measure of state repression in post-conflict countries, we use the latent variable estimates of
repression generated by Fariss (2014). Many cross-national studies of major human rights violations
employ either Cingranelli and Richards’ (CIRI) physical integrity rights index or the Political Terror
Scale (PTS) (Cingranelli and Richards 2010, 1999, Gibney et al. 2017). Fariss’ Human Rights
Protections (HRP) score incorporates data from CIRI and the PTS, as well as data on torture,
government one-sided killings, genocide/politicide, and political executions from seven additional
sources. The latent variable approach provides a more valid measure of state repression by using
an item response theory model to aggregate multiple related indicators of the concept
(Schnakenberg and Fariss 2014). This approach also provides more complete coverage of countries
across time. In contrast to CIRI’s physical integrity index, which is available between 1981 and 2012,
and the Political Terror Scale, which covers 1976 to 2015, the Human Rights Protection score is
available for 204 countries between 1949 and 2015. Finally, Fariss uses a Bayesian model to correct
for bias due to the increasingly strict standards of accountability of human rights monitoring
agencies over time. Fariss (2014) provides strong evidence that the human rights country reports
produced by the U.S. State Department and Amnesty International – which are the basis for the
measures created by CIRI and the PTS – are biased by changes in the standard of accountability
over time due to these agencies’ efforts to gather more accurate information, broaden the scope of
their information-gathering, and pressure governments that are improving human rights to con-
tinue reforms.
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In the full dataset, Fariss’ Human Rights Protections measure varies from −3.13 to +4.69 with
a mean of .25 and a standard deviation of 1.36. Higher values indicate better human rights
practices. For the observations in our dataset – annual observations of countries for ten years
following the termination of an armed conflict – the HRP score varies from −2.85 to +1.58 with
a mean of −.69. In the first year post-conflict, the average HRP score is −.81.
Key Independent Variables
While detailed data on development and humanitarian aid are abundant, military aid data are
sparse. The United States provides detailed data on the amounts and types of overt security
assistance they provide. However, most countries do not make the military aid they provide to
foreign countries publicly available in any systematic way. As a result, most studies focus exclu-
sively on U.S. military aid, or investigate the effects of arms transfers rather than aid. Neither of
these strategies is ideal for addressing our research question. Since we are interested in how the
magnitude and types of military aid provided to a government affect conditions in the country,
measures which exclude assistance provided by Russia, China, France, and other powerful states –
or even less powerful neighbors of the post-conflict country – would be misleading. At the same
time, measures of arms transfers do not capture other common forms of foreign military assistance
like financing, training, advising, and troop deployments.
Our imperfect solution is to use two separate variables as proxy measures of foreign military
assistance – the volume of Major Conventional Weapons (MCW) suitable for use against domestic
threats transferred to the post-conflict country, and an indicator of military aid provision con-
structed from machine-coded events data. Each of these measures has limitations, which we
discuss below. However, testing our hypothesis with two distinct proxies for security assistance
will allow us to assess the robustness of our results.
Aside from capturing only one form of foreign security assistance, the primary limitation of
weapons transfers as a measure of military aid is that arms imports could be a proxy for the
importing regime’s intent to repress the domestic population, rather than an exogenous factor that
increases a regime’s capacity and willingness to forcibly repress internal dissent.3 We take two
steps to address the potential endogeneity of arms imports, the most likely threat to the validity of
our results and those of earlier studies. First, we control for prior levels of repression in the post-
conflict country and use a five-year backward-moving average of arms imports, instead of arms
imports in the year that human rights conditions are measured, to increase our confidence that
imports predict levels of repression rather than the reverse. In addition, we instrument the transfer
of weapon systems useful for internal use against domestic threats with a measure of imports of
weapons not as likely to be employed against internal threats. We discuss this instrument,
borrowed from Pamp et al. (2018), in greater detail below.
We use data on arms imports from the Stockholm Institute for Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
data on major conventional weapons (MCW) transfers as disaggregated by Pamp et al. (2018). SIPRI
measures the volume of arms imports and exports in trend indicator values (TIV), approximating the
inflation-adjusted production costs of major conventional weapon systems in millions of constant-
1990 U.S. dollars. Pamp and co-authors disaggregate the SIPRI data on MCW imports into two
categories. Logimports measures the (logged) volume of imported weapons most relevant to internal
uses of force – aircraft, armored vehicles, artillery, and missiles. Logimports_unrelated captures the
value of arms imports less likely to be employed against internal threats – air-defense systems, anti-
submarine weapons, satellites, and ships (Pamp et al. 2018, 7).4 Engines, sensors, and weapons
recorded as ‘other’ are not included in either variable. Two additional variables, Logimports_avg5
and Logimports_unrelated_avg5, measure the moving average of arms imports in the past 5 years.
Following Pamp et al. (2018), we use the value of less ‘internally-relevant’ arms imports as an
instrument for the imports of weapons more appropriate for use internally. The authors argue
that the ‘unrelated’ weapons are predominantly imported to address external threats, as well as
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for reasons related to corruption, military greed, and prestige. While they are concerned that
the measure is exogenous to their dependent variable – civil war onset, we argue that these
‘unrelated’ major conventional weapons systems are also plausibly exogenous to a regime’s
desire to use force against unarmed civilians. There is little reason to believe that governments
stock up on anti-submarine weapons and air-defense systems when their intent is to forcibly
repress civilian dissidents. Of course, an instrumental variable must be unrelated to the
dependent variable of interest (human rights conditions), but also a good predictor of the
endogenous variable (internally-relevant arms transfers). Pamp et al. (2018) note that govern-
ments tend to import weapons more deployable internally in conjunction with these ‘unrelated’
weapons systems in order to maintain a balanced weapons portfolio. Figure 1 displays the
volume of internally-relevant and “;unrelated” weapons transferred to post-conflict countries
between 1950 and 2012. We report first stage regression results and diagnostic statistics
demonstrating that the volume of ‘unrelated’ arms imports is a substantively and statistically
significant predictor of imports of more internally relevant weapons in Table A1 in the
appendix. We also test a model with an additional exogenous regressor, a count of the number
of borders the post-conflict country shares with other states. Because this variable is not
a significant predictor of internally-relevant arms transfers, and inclusion of the additional
instrument does not change our results, we only report results with the single instrument.
To construct a more direct measure of military aid provided to a post-conflict country, we use
event data from the Cline Center for Democracy (Althaus et al. 2017).5 The Cline Center Historical
Figure 1. Major conventional weapons transfers to post-conflict countries, 1950–2012.
Note: Data on major conventional weapons (MCW) transfers from the Stockholm Institute for Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) as disaggregated by
Pamp et al. (2018).
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Phoenix Event Data were machine-coded from approximately 14 million articles from the New York
Times, British Broadcasting Corporation’s Summary of World Broadcasts, and the Central
Intelligence Agency’s Foreign Broadcast Information Service. The data identify over five million
events between 1945 and 2015, but because the years for which articles from each of the three
sources are available vary, events are coded from all three sources only between 1995 and 2004.
We use the dataset’s coding for the event date, event initiator and target, and the Conflict and
Mediation Event Observations (CAMEO) event code (Gerner et al. 2002, Schrodt 2012) to identify
observations in which a post-conflict country in our dataset is the target of an event with the
CAMEO code for ‘Provide military aid.’ We aggregate observations to the post-conflict country-year,
creating one measure of the number of different countries coded as initiators of a military aid
provision ‘event’ to the post-conflict country in each post-conflict year, and another dichotomous
indicator for whether any state provided military aid to the post-conflict country in each year. For
most of the model specifications reported below we employ a third variable, militaryaid_2yr, that
equals one if a country received military aid in the past two years.6 We test the robustness of our
results to three alternative measures: dichotomous indicators for the receipt of military aid in the
past three years, the past five years, and just in the year prior to observation of human rights
conditions in the country. Although these are crude measures of security assistance, we do not
attempt to create more granular measures from the events data because we suspect the data are
extremely noisy.
Descriptive statistics for all of our variables are provided in Table 1. It is likely that our measures
of arms transfers and military aid underestimate the true volume of security assistance provided to
a post-conflict country. The SIPRI arms transfer data do not capture all military-to-military equip-
ment transfers or include the small arms and light weapons trade. In addition, neither the arms
transfer nor the events data are likely to capture covert assistance provided by foreign states, or
any assistance provided by non-state actors. Finally, not all instances of military aid provision will
be reported in the news media and, in particular, the New York Times or the BBC summary of World
Broadcasts, the two sources that provide the majority of the articles processed by the Cline Center.
While more complete and reliable data would certainly be preferable, we believe that systematic
underestimation of the amount of security assistance is most likely to bias against finding any
support for our hypothesis that security assistance increases state repression – particularly because
overt weapons transfers and military aid to states with more transparent, open societies are most
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
Human Rights Protections (HRP) Score 1,645 −0.690 0.950 −2.851 1.582
Internally-relevant arms transfers (5 yr avg, logged) 1,582 5.428 3.787 0 12.645
Unrelated arms transfers (5 yr avg, logged) 1,582 2.394 3.277 0 10.827
Military aid in last 2 years 1,705 0.204 0.403 0 1
Pre-conflict HRP Score (5 yr avg) 1,316 −0.841 0.868 −2.848 1.431
GDP per capita (logged) 1,534 12.128 0.979 9.899 14.981
Population (logged) 1,534 14.147 1.496 10.796 18.637
Conflict recurrence 1,697 0.249 0.432 0 1
Years post-conflict 1,705 5.412 2.870 1 10
Executive constraints 1,364 3.158 1.999 1 7
Conflict duration (logged) 1,705 6.323 2.073 0.693 10.034
Military expenditures (logged) 1,368 12.291 2.571 0 18.711
Official Development Assistance (logged) 1,146 19.745 1.202 12.578 23.240
Conflict spread (proportion of territory) 1,685 0.197 0.398 0 1
Government conflict casualties 1,008 16855 100667 0 1000000
Rebel conflict casualties 988 20460 89392 0 731000
Ethnic conflict 1,705 0.374 0.484 0 1
Multinational peacekeeping 1,700 0.177 0.382 0 1
Post-Cold War conflict 1,705 0.490 0.500 0 1
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likely to be captured in our data sources and these conditions should be negatively correlated with
human rights abuses.
Control Variables
As foreign military support is not randomly assigned to post-conflict countries, it is likely that the
countries to which external support is provided are systematically different from the countries to
which no support is provided. If these differences are also determinants of human rights practices
in post-conflict countries, it will be difficult to determine whether any observed differences
between countries are due to military aid or pre-existing conditions. We therefore include several
additional variables in order to control for possible confounding effects.
We account for prewar human rights conditions with a variable measuring the post-conflict
country’s average Human Rights Protection score in the five years prior to conflict onset.
Alternative models, reported in the appendix, compare each country’s HRP score six years after
conflict termination to its score in the first post-conflict year and include conflict-level fixed effects.
In addition, we test the robustness of our results to the inclusion of variables measuring the
country’s GDP per capita, the size of its population, the intensity and duration of the recently
terminated armed conflict (conflict casualties and territorial spread), and the number of years that
have elapsed since conflict termination. It is plausible that human rights conditions will be worse in
countries with low levels of GDP per capita and large populations, as well as those that have
recently ended more severe or prolonged wars. At the same time, these countries may receive
more foreign security assistance because of their level of need. An additional variable measures
constraints on the chief executive of the post-conflict country in the first year after conflict
termination. This measure, from the Polity IV dataset, is an index that ranges from 1–7 and
measures ‘the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making power of chief execu-
tives’ (Marshall and Jaggers 2002, 23).7 Countries with more robust institutional constraints on the
governing regime tend to have greater respect for human rights (Cingranelli and Richards 1999,
Davenport 2007, Henderson 1991, Poe and Tate 1994, Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999) and may receive
different amounts or types of assistance than those with less constrained governments.
We control for the amount of official development assistance (ODA) provided to the country
because development and security assistance are often packaged together, and both have been
posited to influence human rights practices. Levels of ODA can proxy for a number of other unmea-
sured country-level attributes that influence foreign assistance allocations. Of course, it is also possible
that recipient regimes use aid intended for development projects to increase military spending (Kono
and Montinola 2013, Langlotz and Potrafke 2016). Including this measure allows us to test whether
external sources of revenue in general, or military aid in particular, increase state repression.
Two additional control variables indicate the presence of multinational peacekeeping forces in
the post-conflict period and post-Cold War observation years. Both the magnitude and the type of
security assistance a country receives may be different if peacekeeping forces are present in the
country. Some studies have found that, controlling for a growing consensus that the United
Nations is more likely to intervene when the human rights situation in a country is particularly
dire (Fortna 2008, Gilligan 2003, Melander 2009), peacekeeping operations can reduce violence
against civilians in post-conflict countries (Murdie and Davis 2010, Kathman and Wood 2016,
Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013). There is also reason to believe that security assistance
was different in magnitude or type during the Cold War and that major suppliers’ concern about,
and influence over, the human rights records of their clients changed after the Soviet Union
collapsed (Blanton 2005, Akerman and Seim 2014).
Because the resumption of armed conflict in a country could drive an increase in foreign security
assistance and state repression, we include a dummy variable indicating that violent conflict has
recurred for each post-conflict year in which there are more than 25 deaths directly attributable to
the conflict. Finally, there is some evidence that human rights violations by the state are greater
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during conflicts in which the opposition was mobilized on the basis of ethnic identity (Sullivan and
Karreth, Forthcoming). Since these human rights abuses may persist into the post-conflict period
and foreign governments may be more or less likely to provide aid to countries that have recently
terminated an ethnic conflict, we also include a dummy variable control for ethnic conflict.
Each of these variables is listed in Table 1. To explore the robustness of our results we test
models with multiple combinations of these variables included as controls, as well as models in
which some variables are included as modifiers interacted with our key explanatory variables.
Statistical Method
Our outcome variable is a latent, continuous measure of states’ human rights conditions. We test both
instrumental variables linear regression models, estimated with the continuously-updated GMM (CUE)
estimator, and ordinary least squares regression models.8 All models are estimated with two-way
cluster-robust standard errors – standard errors clustered on both country and year of observation.
These standard errors should be robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity andwithin-panel autocorrelation
as well as contemporaneous cross-panel correlation (Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman 2010).
Results
Table 2 displays the results from the estimation of models predicting a post-conflict country’s
Human Rights Protection score in a given year. Results for Models 1 and 3 are second-stage
estimates with the instrumented measure of internally-relevant arms transfers to the country.
Models 2, 4, and 5 are estimated with single equations. Model 2 does not contain a measure of
arms transfers and Model 4 includes the un-instrumented measure of internally-relevant arms
imports as well as the separate measure of ‘unrelated’ arms transfers. All five models are estimated
with robust standard errors clustered by country and year to account for correlation of errors
within countries across time and within years across countries. The bottom of the table reports
statistics from diagnostic tests of the validity of our excluded instrument for arms imports. First
stage regression results for Model 3 are reported in Table A1 of the online appendix.
A valid instrument must be both uncorrelated with the error terms for the second-stage estimates
and a strong predictor of the endogenous independent variable. Our first stage regression results
demonstrate that logimports_unrelated_avg5 is a substantively and statistically significant predictor of
more internally-relevant weapons imports (p < .001). Moreover, a weak-instruments test, in which the
Wald F statistic derived from the Kleibergen-Paap rk statistic is evaluated against the Stock-Yogo
critical value, confirms that ‘unrelated’ arms imports are a sufficiently strong instrument. In every
model, the F statistic exceeds the critical value for the endogenous regressor, allowing us to reject
the null hypothesis that the instrument is weak. The exogeneity of our instrument is a theoretical
issue. As noted above, we argue that regimes that intend to use imported weapons to repress the
domestic population are unlikely to prioritize anti-submarine weapons and air-defense systems.
However, endogeneity tests for our endogenous regressor indicate that we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that internally-relevant arms transfers can be treated as exogenous (Baum, Schaffer, and
Stillman 2010). In response, we also estimate OLS models without an excluded instrument, which
should be more efficient if arms imports are exogenous (see Models 4 and 5 in Table 2).
The estimates reported in Table 2 show that both military aid and arms imports are negatively
correlated with Human Rights Protection (HRP) scores in post-conflict countries. Models 1 and 2
include only a measure of arms transfers (the natural log of the 5-year backward-rolling average of
internally-relevant arms imports, instrumented) or military aid (a dichotomous indicator of
a military aid ‘event’ in the past two years) and the country’s average HRP score in the five years
prior to the armed conflict. Models 3 and 4 include both key explanatory variables and a host of
control variables.9 As noted above, Models 4 and 5 are estimated without an excluded instrument
for internally-relevant arms transfers. In Model 4, logimports_unrelated_avg5 is included as a control
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variable. Model 5 drops control variables that do not have a substantively or statistically significant
effect on our key explanatory variables and do not themselves improve model fit. Tables in the
online appendix report results from multiple alternative model specifications.
The coefficient and standard error estimates for our key explanatory variables are remarkably
consistent across the models. Both military aid and relevant arms transfers are statistically sig-
nificant at the p < .05 level in every model, providing consistent evidence in support of our
hypothesis. Even after attempting to purge the endogenous component of our arms transfers
measure with a strong instrument, and controlling for factors that could predict both security
assistance and state repression – including human rights conditions in the country prior to the
conflict – security sector assistance has a substantively and statistically significant negative impact
on human rights conditions in post-conflict countries.
In the interest of parsimony, and to retain as many observations as possible, we use the
estimates from Model 5 to discuss substantive effects. Figure 2 plots the marginal effects of all
of the variables in Models 5. Human Rights Protection scores are, on average, .23 points lower (on
a scale that runs from −2.85 to 1.58) when a post-conflict country has received military aid in the
past two years. For comparison, the magnitude of the effect of military aid is almost three times
that of a one-point decrease in executive constraints.
Figure 3 contains a plot of predicted HRP scores over the average value (logged) of internally-
relevant arms transferred to the country in the last five years, and a plot of predicted HRP scores
over the value of official development assistance (ODA) given to the country. All other variables are
Table 2. Effects of Arms Transfers and Military Aid on Human Rights Protections in Post-Conflict Countries, 1957–2015.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Arms transfers (relevant, 5yr avg, ln) −0.048* −0.071** −0.061** −0.078**
0.021 0.025 0.019 0.019
Military aid in last 2 years −0.473** −0.29** −0.296** −0.232**
0.111 0.078 0.074 0.078
Pre-conflict HRP Score 0.548** 0.522** 0.411** 0.414** 0.396**
0.061 0.060 0.058 0.055 0.048
Development aid (ln) 0.086* 0.081* 0.101*
0.039 0.041 0.041
GDP per capita (ln) 0.069 0.058 0.076
0.101 0.092 0.091
Conflict recurrence −0.581** −0.584** −0.591**
0.109 0.107 0.107
Years post-conflict 0.060* 0.061** 0.057**
0.011 0.011 0.011
Executive constraints 0.057 0.059 0.075*
0.035 0.034 0.035
Conflict duration (ln) 0.017 0.017
0.034 0.034
Post-conflict peacekeeping force −0.028 −0.024
0.166 0.166
Post-Cold War observation year 0.200 0.213
0.122 0.123
Unrelated arms transfers (5 yr avg, ln) −0.006
0.018
Constant 0.031 −0.158 −3.061 −2.895 −3.253
0.126 0.095 1.282 1.208 1.187
N (post-conflict country-years) 1028 1042 870 870 870
Countries 70 71 64 64 64
Years 57 59 50 50 50
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 258.93 155.81
Endogeneity test (cluster robust) chi2 p-value 0.150 0.721
Note: Instrumental variables linear regression models estimated with continuously-updated GMM (CUE) estimator using the
ivreg2 Stata module in Stata 14 (Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman 2010). Two-way cluster-robust standard errors listed below
coefficient estimates. Excluded instrument: 5-year backward-moving average (logged) of transfers of major conventional
weapons unlikely to be practical for use against internal threats.
*p < .05; **p < .01.
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held constant at their mean values. Although the point predictions should be interpreted with
caution due to the imprecision of our measure of arms transfers, the figure makes it clear that
human rights conditions generally decline as the volume of arms transferred to the country
increases. Large transfers of weapons that can be used against internal threats are associated
with substantial increases in state repression in post-conflict countries. In contrast, levels of Official
Development Assistance (ODA) are positively correlated with human rights protections.
While the literature is divided about the impact of development and humanitarian aid in
conflict-affected countries, some recent research has found associations between economic aid
and human rights violations in countries with weak mechanisms of accountability (Cingranelli,
Fajardo-Heyward, and Filippov 2014, Bell et al. 2013, DeMeritt and Young 2013). Our results suggest
development aid could be beneficial in post-conflict countries. In contrast to arms transfers and
military aid, Official Development Assistance appears to improve human rights conditions in the
decade after conflict termination. In the plot of predicted Human Rights Protections scores over
levels of development aid (logged) in Figure 3, the 95% confidence interval is wide at low levels of
aid, but the contrast between the effects of economic assistance and major conventional weapons
transfers is clear. It is possible that the apparent effect of ODA is due to selection bias if more
repressive states are precluded from receiving aid. We hope future studies will further investigate
this relationship.
Other control variables in the models perform largely as expected, although not all have
a statistically significant impact on human rights conditions. A country’s pre-conflict human rights
record is highly correlated with Human Rights Protections in the post-conflict period. The only
other statistically significant variables are conflict recurrence, years post-conflict, and executive
constraints. If the post-conflict country experiences renewed armed conflict, the predicted HRP
score drops by .59 points, while a one-point increase in constraints on the executive increases
Figure 2. Model 5 coefficient and 95% confidence interval estimates.
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a country’s HRP score by .08.10 In addition, human rights protections generally improve over time.
Plotting annual human rights protection scores over the post-conflict decade suggests a nearly
linear relationship between the number of years that have elapsed since a conflict ended and
human rights conditions, with average HRP scores rising approximately .06 points each year after
war termination.
We find no relationship between a country’s GDP per capita and its human rights condi-
tions in the post-conflict period. Some models suggest HRP scores are systematically higher in
post-Cold War observation years, but the coefficient estimate on a dummy for post-Cold War
years is not statistically significant in our primary models and inclusion of this variable does
not impact the effects of arms transfers or military aid. The presence of a post-conflict
peacekeeping force also does not have a systematic effect on human rights protections in
post-conflict societies. This may be because, as others have suggested, peacekeepers are sent
to countries at highest risk of human rights abuses, or because our dichotomous measure
fails to capture important differences among peacekeeping missions11 (Fortna 2004, 2008,
Kathman and Wood 2016, Murdie and Davis 2010). Military expenditures have a substantively
significant negative impact on human rights protections in models that do not contain
security assistance measures (results not shown). However, the effect diminishes when
a military aid indicator is added, and disappears altogether if the model includes a measure
of internally-relevant arms transferred to the post-conflict country.
Figure 3. Human rights protections by development aid and arms transfers.
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Robustness of Results
Table A2 in the appendix displays the results from several alternative model specifications. Results
from Model 5 above are included for reference. Robust M1 and Robust M2 replicate Models 3 and 5
above with just one observation per armed conflict – in the fifth year after conflict termination.
Despite the sharp reduction in the number of observations, the effects of receiving military aid in the
past two years are larger, while the effects of arms transfers are still statistically significant but slightly
smaller, comparing only across countries five years into the post-conflict period. Robust M3 estimates
the effects of receiving military aid and internally-relevant weapons on the change in a country’s HRP
score from the first to the sixth year after conflict termination. In this model, military aid is negative,
but not statistically significant. Arms transfers have a robust negative effect on a country’s human
rights conditions. Our fixed effects model, Robust M4, shows substantively smaller, but still statisti-
cally significant effects of military aid and arms transfers from within each post-conflict country.
Table A3, also included the appendix, tests model specifications with additional control variables
and interactions between variables. None of the intra-war characteristics for which we controlled
had a significant effect on human rights conditions after conflict termination. While ethnic mobi-
lization may be associated with higher risk of government atrocities against civilians during an
armed conflict, the effects do not appear to persist into the post-conflict period. Similarly, neither
the duration of the conflict, nor high government casualties, are associated with levels of repres-
sion after war termination. Surprisingly, we also find no evidence that the effects of security
assistance are moderated by institutional constraints on the chief executive in the post-conflict
regime. While executive constraints have a positive independent effect on the level of repression in
a post-conflict country, military aid and arms transfers have the same negative impact in countries
with highly-constrained and less constrained political leaders.
The models in Table A4 probe the robustness of our results to the use of alternative measures of
human rights conditions and changes in the timespan of the military aid indicator. As noted above,
many cross-national studies of repression use either Cingranelli and Richards (2010, 1999) physical
integrity rights index or the Political Terror Scale (PTS) (Gibney et al. 2017).12 The first two models in
Table A4 replicate Model 5 from the text substituting the CIRI or PTS measure of repression for the
Human Rights Protection Score as the dependent variable. CIRI uses a 9-point scale that runs from
zero (lowest level of respect for physical integrity rights) to eight (highest level of respect for
physical integrity rights). The Political Terror Scale varies from one (lowest level of political terror) to
five (highest level of political terror). Due to the shorter temporal range of both datasets, we lose
cases when substituting either of these measures for the HRP score. Despite this, our central results
are confirmed. Both military aid and arms transfers lower respect for physical integrity rights and
increase levels of violent repression. In Robust Models 11–13, we again adopt the HRP score as our
measure of human rights conditions but vary the way that we capture military aid provided to the
country. M11 employs a dichotomous variable indicating receipt of military aid in the past year.
M12 and M13 use indicators for the receipt of military aid in the past three years and five years,
respectively. The coefficient estimates show stable levels of statistical significance (p < .01) and
substantive effects on human rights protections across the three measures.
The consistency of our estimates demonstrate that the negative relationship between security
assistance and human rights conditions is robust to multiple estimation techniques and a wide
range of model specifications. Although parameter estimates vary somewhat across models, the
coefficients remain statistically and substantively significant.
Conclusion
This study sought to evaluate how military aid and arms transfers to post-conflict countries affect
the human rights practices of recipient regimes. We argued that significant flows of lethal capacity
from foreign governments could encourage a regime to adopt a more restrictive-repressive
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approach to governance by: (1) increasing the state’s capacity and lowering its cost for repression,
and (2) strengthening the security sector relative to other state institutions. To overcome significant
data limitations and endogeneity concerns we created a novel measure of military aid from event
data and adopted an instrumental variable for arms transfers to post-conflict countries. The results
of our empirical analyses provide strong evidence that governments become more repressive
when they receive military aid or major conventional weapons transfers in the decade after conflict
termination. In stark contrast, we find that levels of Official Development Assistance (ODA) are
positively correlated with human rights conditions in post-conflict countries.
We began our paper with a puzzle generated by American lethal aid transfers to South Korea
and El Salvador. We now return to the implications of our study for U.S. foreign policy, as building
partner forces in conflict-affected regions has become a cornerstone of U.S. defense policy over the
last decade. In FY2017, the United States allocated over $20 billion dollars for security assistance to
foreign governments. Between 2001 and 2017, U.S. aid to the military and police in foreign
countries totaled over $291 billion.13
Since the late 1990s, the Leahy Amendments have conditioned the provision of lethal aid to
military units deemed to have engaged in gross human rights violations (Serafino et al. 2014). These
congressional acts represent important steps forward in mandating oversight for the deleterious
impact that U.S. lethal aid may have in fragile states. As U.S. security assistance in Iraq and
Afghanistan shows, however, monitoring the human rights impact of U.S. assistance is an enduring
challenge. In both countries, critics have raised concerns about extrajudicial killings, mass arrests, and
high rates of civilian casualties in operations by military units trained, equipped, and advised by the
American military.14 At the same time, these units are typically the most capable components of
otherwise weak national security forces and there is anecdotal evidence that concerted training,
monitoring, and oversight efforts have reduced abuses by units receiving U.S. security force assis-
tance (Watts et al. 2018). Iraqi counter-terrorism (CT) units, for example, once implicated in human
rights abuses and sectarian targeting (Witty 2015), have rehabilitated their image, arguably as a result
of having ‘received concentrated and continuous training. . . [in which] American trainers put a special
emphasis on human rights in an effort to keep the force beyond reproach.’15
The primary contribution of this study is substantial new evidence on systematic trends in the
relationship between foreign security assistance and human rights conditions in post-conflict coun-
tries. There is far morework to be done in the context of larger research agendas on the human security
impacts of military aid and the determinants of the quality of the peace in post-conflict countries.
Additional research is needed, for example, to determine whether conditioning aid on good govern-
ance or greater emphasis on security sector reforms can effectively counteract the general tendency of
states to use enhanced repressive capacity against the civilian population. Nevertheless, these results
hold important implications for major arms and aid providers, particularly as the international com-
munity is confronted with a growing number of countries emerging fromdevastating internal conflicts.
The data we use from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) indicates that
between 1950 and 2015 the average post-conflict country received major conventional weapons
valued at almost $237 million dollars16 in the decade after conflict termination. Governments should
be mindful of the risk that arming and equipping security forces in fragile states could encourage the
government to rely on repression as a response to dissent and make state repression more deadly.
Particular caution is warranted when transferring the types of weapons that are most likely to be used
against internal threats to a regime in the wake of internal armed conflicts.
Notes
1. CIA World Factbook. ‘South Korea’. Accessed at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook
/geos/ks.html
2. It is important to note that all aid is fungible to some extent (McGuire 1978) and leaders could use foreign
security assistance to reduce state spending on the military and reallocate the savings to public goods
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provision. However, scholars have found evidence that differences in the fungibility of different types of aid
can have divergent effects on government spending. Feyzioglu, Swaroop, and Zhu (1998), for example, find
that governments receiving aid for education, agriculture, or energy reduce the share of their own resources
allocated to these sectors and spend the savings elsewhere. Less fungible aid earmarked for transportation
and communications projects tends to be spent on those sectors. We follow a similar path here, arguing that
aid to a state’s security sector may create stronger incentives for leaders to choose more repressive strategies
for retaining power than other types of aid because of its direct effect on repressive capacity. We believe it is
unlikely that post-conflict governments will reduce their own security sector spending in response for foreign
security assistance because leaders are particularly vulnerable to domestic threats after internal armed
conflicts, non-tax sources of revenue tend to reduce incentives to invest in public goods, and military spending
can be used to reward military loyalty. In fact, most research to date has been concerned about the reverse –
the risk that countries will use economic aid to increase military spending (Langlotz and Potrafke 2016, Kono
and Montinola 2013).
3. The volume of arms transfers to a country may also be more reflective of domestic industrial policy or
commercial interests in weapon-producing states than of their foreign policy concerns. This is an important
issue addressed in other scholarship. We do not think the motivation of arms providers should change the
impact of these transfers on recipients except in the sense that arms exporters may be less selective about the
governments they transfer weapons to if they are not viewing arms exports as a foreign policy tool.
4. Each variable is the natural log of the TIV multiplied by 100. SIPRI only records arms trades where the TIV of the
weapons is at least .5 (U.S.$500,000).
5. The Historical Phoenix Event Data are described in more detail in Althaus, Scott, Joseph Bajjalieh, John
F. Carter, Buddy Peyton, and Dan A. Shalmon. 2017. ‘Cline Center Historical Phoenix Event Data Variable
Descriptions’. Cline Center Historical Phoenix Event Data. v.1.0.0. Cline Center for Democracy, June 30. http://
www.clinecenter.illinois.edu/data/event/phoenix/.
6. We use a two-year period (rather than simply a one-year lag) because the training, equipment, weapons, and
other capacity-building goods and services provided by an external state should continue to benefit the
security sector for some number of years after aid is delivered.
7. Using only the executive constraints measure from the Polity IV dataset, rather than the full democracy index,
allows us to avoid potential endogeneity. Scholars have noted that several components of the democracy
index implicitly capture human rights protections in the measure (Hill and Jones 2014, 677). We hold executive
constraints constant at its level in the year after conflict termination because including a time-varying measure
runs the risk of introducing post-treatment bias. We predict that security assistance will increase state
repression, but it may also impede democratization by similar mechanisms.
8. Our instrumental variables regression models are estimated with the ivreg2 Stata module in Stata 14 (Baum,
Schaffer, and Stillman 2010). As recommended by Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman (2007), we use the Continuous
Updating Estimator (CUE) to improve the efficiency of IV-2SLS estimates with clustered standard errors.
9. Models including control variables not appearing in these models are included in the online appendix.
10. Although the executive constraints measure is a 7-point scale, not a continuous variable, including the
measure as a series of category dummies does not significantly improve the fit of the model or change our
substantive results. We treat the variable as continuous for parsimony. Similarly, models representing elapsed
time as a count of post-conflict years, as we do in the models in Table 2, performed on par with models
employing various transformation of elapsed time. There is no evidence of a nonlinear relationship.
11. Recent scholarship suggests the impact of peacekeeping operations varies with the number of troops
committed, the nature of the operation (e.g. Chapter VI or Chapter VII, traditional peacekeeping or multi-
dimensional peace enforcement), and whether the intervention is conducted by the United Nations. See Doyle
and Sambanis (2000), Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon (2013), and Solomon (2007) for discussions of salient
differences among peacekeeping operations.
12. The PTS measures levels of state-sanctioned killings, torture, disappearances and political imprisonment. The
CIRI physical integrity index measures the prevalence of torture, extrajudicial killing, disappearances, and
political imprisonment.
13. This figure includes Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), and
several smaller funds (U.S. Department of State. ‘Foreign Military Financing Account Summary.’ 30 June 2016).
The majority of this aid goes to approximately 60 countries in the form of financing for the purchase of
American weapons. In 2016, the U.S. purchased $10 billion worth of weapons for other countries.
(DefenseNews.com, 29 November 2017).
14. See, for example, Dan Lamothe. ‘The Afghan Air Force is Growing. So Are Questions about Its Actions in
Combat.’ Washington Post. 30 July 2018; Shane Bauer. ‘Iraq’s New Death Squad: America has built an elite and
lethal counterterrorism force. But who’s calling the shots?’ The Nation. 3 June 2009; Human Rights Watch, ‘Iraq:
Secret Jail Uncovered in Baghdad,’ Human Rights Watch, 1 February 2011, http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/02/
01/iraq-secret-jail-uncovered-baghdad.
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15. Loveday Morris. 2016. ‘The Force Leading the Fight against ISIS Went from “Dirty Division” to Golden Boys.’
Washington Post 26 July 2016.
16. Approximate inflation-adjusted production costs in constant-1990 U.S. dollars.
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Appendix
Table A1. First-stage regression results for model 3.
Coefficient Robust SE
‘Unrelated’ Arms Transfers (5 yr average, ln) 0.574 0.056
Military aid in last 2 years 0.108 0.328
Development assistance (ln) 0.242 0.176
Pre-conflict HRP score −0.052 0.212
GDP per capita (ln) 0.702 0.244
Conflict recurrence 0.237 0.293
Years post-conflict −0.109 0.044
Executive constraints −0.264 0.071
Conflict duration −0.096 0.096
Military expenditures (ln) 0.498 0.085
Constant −13.406 4.864
F test of excluded instruments: F(1, 49) = 106.13 P-val = 0.000
Stock-Wright LM S statistic Chi-sq = 7.10 P-val = 0.008
Note: Dependent variable is the natural log of the backward-moving 5-year average of ‘relevant’ arms
transfers. Statistics robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering on country and observation year.
Table A2. Alternative model specifications predicting human rights protection scores.
Model 5 Robust M1 Robust M2 Robust M3 Robust M4
Military aid in last 2 years −0.232*** −0.436** −0.430** −0.048*
0.078 0.176 0.171 0.029
Military aid in last 5 years −0.123
0.143
Arms transfers (5 yrs, relevant, ln) −0.078*** −0.064** −0.088*** −0.020***
0.019 0.032 0.020 0.006
Arms transfers instrumented −0.055*
0.031
Development assistance (ln) 0.101** 0.050 0.055 0.060 0.068***
0.041 0.069 0.067 0.043 0.016
Pre-conflict HRP score 0.396*** 0.419*** 0.417***
0.048 0.081 0.080
HRP score first post-conflict year 0.733***
0.097
GDP per capita (ln) 0.076 0.027 0.037 0.062
0.091 0.106 0.093 0.066
Conflict recurrence −0.591*** −0.534*** −0.532*** −0.260** −0.301***
0.107 0.154 0.155 0.109 0.033
Years post-conflict 0.057*** 0.051***
0.011 0.003
Executive constraints 0.075** 0.094** 0.092**
0.035 0.035 0.035
Arms transfers (5 yrs, unrelated) 0.006 0.044 0.018**
0.032 0.029 0.009
Conflict-level fixed effects no no no no yes
Constant −3.253 −1.431 −1.623 −1.509 −2.256
1.187 2.032 1.853 1.209 0.318
N 870 91 91 93 1134
Note: Cluster-robust standard errors listed below coefficient estimates. Robust M1 and Robust M2 replicate Models 3 and 5
from the text with just one observation per armed conflict – in the fifth year after conflict termination. Robust M3 is
estimated only on observations of countries six years after conflict termination, controlling for each country’s HRP score in
the first post-conflict year. Robust M4 is estimated with fixed effects for each armed conflict. *p < .1; **p < .05, ***p < .01.
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Table A3. Robustness checks with additional control variables and interactions.
Robust M5 Robust M6 Robust M7 Robust M8
Military aid in last 2 years −0.200*** −0.212*** −0.257*** −0.229***
0.075 0.079 0.091 0.087
Military aid * constrained executive 0.061
0.202
Arms transfers (5 yrs, relevant, ln) −0.103*** −0.075*** −0.080*** −0.070***
0.023 0.022 0.019 0.017
Arms transfers * constrained executive −0.029
0.030
Development assistance (ln) 0.101* 0.099** 0.108*** 0.114***
0.052 0.046 0.041 0.040
Pre-conflict HRP score 0.294*** 0.389*** 0.382*** 0.377***
0.073 0.056 0.051 0.053
GDP per capita (ln) 0.171 0.079 0.093 0.100
0.113 0.093 0.085 0.083
Conflict recurrence −0.487*** −0.579*** −0.613*** −0.602***
0.098 0.111 0.105 0.108
Years post-conflict 0.048*** 0.055*** 0.058*** 0.057
0.012 0.012 0.011 0.011




Government conflict casualties 0.000
0.000




Constrained executive (dummy) 0.302* 0.469**
0.154 0.211
Constant −4.323 −3.118 −3.448 −3.715
1.566 1.257 1.122 1.114
N 520 835 876 876
Note: Two-way cluster-robust standard errors listed below coefficient estimates. All models replicate Model 5 (Table 2) from the
text with additional control variables or interaction terms.
*p < .1; **p < .05, ***p < .01.
DEFENCE AND PEACE ECONOMICS 199
Table A4. Models with alternative measures of human rights conditions and military aid.
CIRI PTS Robust M11 Robust M12 Robust M13
Military aid in past 2 years −0.759*** 0.319***
0.233 0.103
Arms transfers (5yrs, relevant) −0.102*** 0.034* −0.08*** −0.077*** −0.079***
0.039 0.02 0.019 0.019 0.019
Military aid in past year −0.243***
0.067
Military aid in past 3 years −0.253***
0.089
Military aid in past 5 years −0.244***
0.077
Development assistance (ln) 0.068 −0.099 0.099** 0.102** 0.097**
0.117 0.048 0.041 0.041 0.041
Pre-conflict HRP score 0.823*** −0.376*** 0.401*** 0.39*** 0.396***
0.159 0.068 0.048 0.048 0.048
GDP per capita (ln) −0.059 −0.041 0.076 0.077 0.073
0.198 0.094 0.092 0.09 0.091
Conflict recurrence −1.512*** 0.668*** −0.601*** −0.579*** −0.613***
0.239 0.147 0.107 0.107 0.105
Years post-conflict 0.149*** −0.064*** 0.057*** 0.059*** 0.032***
0.032 0.014 0.011 0.011 0.012
Executive constraints 0.251*** −0.081** 0.075** 0.075*** 0.073**
0.084 0.031 0.035 0.035 0.035
Observation year −0.061*** 0.029***
0.013 0.006
Constant 125.638 −51.511 −3.21 −3.301 −2.891
25.395 11.817 1.205 1.175 1.228
N 592 713 870 870 870
Note: Two-way cluster-robust standard errors listed below coefficient estimates.
*p < .1; **p < .05, ***p < .01.
200 P. L. SULLIVAN ET AL.
